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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM
JURY TRIAL IN PENALTY ACTION FOR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
United States v. J. B. Williams Co.
To prevent the dissemination of false advertising, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has been empowered to issue cease and
desist orders where appropriate.1 Upon the petition of the respondent,
such orders are reviewable by a court of appeals,2 and, to the extent
the orders are affirmed, the reviewing court shall issue a parallel en-
forcing order." Where an order has been affirmed, the FTC may redress
subsequent violations thereof either by seeking an adjudication of con-
tempt before the affirming court of appeals,4 or by bringing an action
in a district court for the recovery of civil penalties and the imposition
of equitable relief. 5 In United States v. J. B. Williams Co.,6 the Second
Circuit held that where the FTC chose to seek a civil penalty in the
district court, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial of disputed
factual issues regarding the alleged violation of the order.7
After several years of administrative proceedings, the FTC, having
determined that the advertising of the product Geritol by the J. B.
Williams Company was violative of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (the Act), issued a cease and desist order." Upon Williams' petition
for review of the order, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.9 After a public hearing on compliance and the receipt of
1Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 US.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45, 53, 56 (Supp. I, 1973). Section 55(a) broadly defines "false advertising" as "an
advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect.
Id. § 55(a).
2 15 US.C. § 45(c) (1970). The scope of such review is limited to the "substantial
evidence" rule. Id. See ]FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Under this flexible
standard, de novo judicial review of administrative action is confined to questions of law.
Review of factual questions is restricted to a search of the entire record for "substantial
evidence" reasonably supporting the administrative agency's determination. See 5 US.C.
§ 706 (1970); 4 K. DAvis, ADMNISrRATE LAw TREATISE § 29.01-02 (1958).
3 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). An order may also become final by the failure of a
respondent to petition for review within 60 days of service of the order. Id. § 45(c),(g).
4 18 US.C. § 401 (1970). See United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521,
530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
5 15 U.S.C. § 45(),(m) (Supp. IH, 1973). Criminal proceedings, in certain instances,
may also be brought by the Attorney General upon certification of facts by the FTC.
15 U.S.C. § 54 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 56 (Supp. 111, 1973).
If an FTC order has become finalized by expiration of the 60-day appeal period,
see note 3 supra, the FTC would be limited to a § 45() penalty action.
6498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). Judge Friendly authored the court's opinion, in which
Judge Feinberg joined. Judge Oakes dissented.
7 1d. at 430.
8 The order directed Williams and its wholly-owned advertising agency, Parkson
Advertising Agency, Inc., to cease representing "directly or by implication" that Geritol
provided relief of tiredness unless the advertisements affirmatively disclosed the product's
limited efficacy. Id. at 418 S. n.2.
9J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). The order was enforced
with slight modification. The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce a provision which, in
effect, would have made Geritol a prescription drug. Id. at 891.
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
three compliance reports ° from Williams, the FTC concluded that
the advertisements, although modified, continued to make represen-
tations forbidden by the cease and desist order." Consequently, the
FTC, recommending a civil penalty action, submitted a draft com-
plaint to the Attorney General,12 who thereupon filed the formal com-
plaint against Williams. 8 Over Williams' demand for a jury trial, the
district court granted the Government's motion for summary judg-
ment,14 holding that no right to a jury trial inhered in a civil penalty
action15 and that no issue of material fact as to the violation of the
order existed in the present instance."
Although the order was reviewed by the Sixth Circuit, the Attorney General was
free to institute a civil penalty action in the Southern District of New York since § 45()
does not restrict such actions to the circuit wherein the order is reviewed under § 45(c).
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 45() (Supp. III, 1973).
10 The submission of a compliance report within 60 days after service of the Com-
mission's order is required pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 3.61 (1974). This section also provides
for submission of such further reports as the Commission requires. This 60-day time
limitation corresponds with that provided in 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) for a petition to
review the FTC's order. See note 3 supra. A respondent is thus obligated either to out-
line concrete proposals for compliance or to seek review of the order within 60 days
of receipt of service.
11498 F.2d at 419-20. After the formal rejections of the first two compliance reports,
the FTC advised Williams and Parkson as to the modifications of the advertisements
which would be required to bring them into compliance with the order and thus avoid
further enforcement proceedings. Id.
12 At the time of these proceedings, §§ 45(/) and 56 had not as yet been amended
to allow the FTC to bring a civil penalty action directly when the Attorney General
failed to take such action. Formerly, only the Attorney General was authorized to bring
such a proceeding upon a certification of facts by the 'FTC. However, the Attorney
General, at his own discretion, could refuse to institute a civil penalty action "when,
in reliance on his own legal expertise, he consider[ed] the evidence insufficient to warrant
prosecution." United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 694 (2d Cir. 1966).
Pursuant to the new amendments, when the Attorney General fails to take action within
10 days of the FTC's proposal, the Commission may bring a civil penalty proceeding in
its own behalf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45()-(m), 56 (Supp. III, 1973).
13 Although the FTC's draft complaint recommended an action to recover a total
judgment of $500,000, the government's complaint demanded $500,000 from both Williams
and Parkson, its advertising subsidiary. 498 F.2d at 418. The Second Circuit unanimously
decided that the penalty recommended by the FTC limited the Attorney General's ad
damnum in the civil penalty proceeding. Id. at 437, 462. The court divided, however,
as to whether penalties could be levied against both Williams and Parkson. Judge
Friendly, reasoning that "in practicality, [Parkson] is Williams' advertising division,"
concluded that Parkson should not be treated as a separate entity for the purpose of
the civil penalty. Id. at 436.
14 United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
15 The lower court found neither the sixth nor seventh amendment right to a
jury trial applicable. The sixth amendment was inapplicable, the court reasoned, because
proceedings to recover a civil penalty under § 45() are not criminal in nature. 854
F. Supp. at 529. Nor did the seventh amendment entitle the defendants to a trial by
jury, the court concluded, since a civil penalty action is similar to a civil contempt
proceeding where a right to jury trial does not obtain. Id. at 583 n.6.
16 The district court's holding "that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the advertisements here challenged violate the order," id. at 534, was
crucial to its summary disposition of the proceedings. Even absent a right to jury trial,
[Vol. 49:225
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In reversing, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
since an action to recover a civil penalty is not criminal in nature, the
sixth amendment17 right to trial by jury was not applicable. In reject-
ing the sixth amendment claim, the court of appeals relied upon the
uniquely monetary sanction of the penalty provision and upon the
congressional characterization of the remedy as civil.' 8 Addressing itself
to Williams' argument that a right to jury trial inhered under the
seventh amendment, 9 the court was unable to obtain guidance from
either the Federal Trade Commission Act or the sparse judicial prece-
dent available.20 Nevertheless, Judge Friendly, writing for the majority,
resolved that inasmuch as Congress had delegated plenary power to
the district courts to adjudicate civil penalty actions for violations of
FTC orders,21 and since Congress had expressed no intent to extin-
guish the right to a jury trial traditionally affixed to a civil penalty
remedy,22 the seventh amendment entitled the defendant to jury
resolution of factual issues concerning the alleged order violation. 23
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes found the seventh amend-
ment wholly inapplicable, arguing that the determination as to whether
an FTC order has been violated rests within the province of the FTC
itself and is not appropriate for trial by judge or jury.24 The dissent
forcefully asserted that "great deference" should be accorded the
agency's conclusions25 and criticized the majority opinion as an unten-
the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact of violation would require a bench trial
for resolution. See 6 J. MooaE, FEmA FRAcuca 56.02[7] (2d ed. 1974).
17 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28498 F.2d at 421; see 15 U.S.C. § 45() (Supp. MI, 1973); note 89 infra.
19 "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved...." U.S. CONSr. amend. VII.
20498 F.2d at 422,428,440. See notes 86, 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
21498 F.2d at 422, 424.
22 Id. at 426.
23 Id. at 424, 430.
As noted by Judge Friendly at the outset of the majority opinion, the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial "would, of course, be academic if . . . there were no triable
issues of fact." Id. at 421. However, he discerned a disputed issue of fact in the instant
case, viz., "whether the commercials in question violated the cease and desist order." Id.
at 430-32. Analysis of this issue would involve the two-pronged approach of "determining
what the order means" and "deciding whether the accused commercials ... come within
the order as so construed." Id. at 430-81. Judge Friendly believed that the order was to
be interpreted by the court as a matter of law. Whether the advertisements fell within
the order's proscription, however, was thought to be a factual question which, if
genuinely disputed by the parties, required jury resolution. Id. at 481-34.
24Id. at 458.
25Id. at 454. Judge Oakes acknowledged that not even the district court had ac-
corded any weight to the FTC's determination, having independently decided that the
modified Geritol commercials violated the order. Id. at 460; 854 F. Supp. at 535, 537 n.12.
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able "substitution of judicial judgment" for the expertise of the FTC.20
Judge Oakes reasoned that the civil penalty provision must be inter-
preted in the context of the entire statutory scheme,27 under which
the "principal function" of the Commission is to determine what
advertising violates the Act.2 8 In his opinion, proper administration
of the deceptive advertising provisions of the Act requires the FTC's
expertise both in the formulation of cease and desist orders and in
the crucial final stage of penalizing order violations. By failing to
respect the need for the FTC's expertise at the critical penalty stage,
the majority opinion, in Judge Oakes' view, frustrates the "entire
regulatory scheme. '29 Under the dissent's alternative approach, an
FTC finding that a violation has occurred would be subject to review
by the district court only on a limited "arbitrary or capricious" stan-
dard.80
Despite the urgings of the dissent, substantial support for the ma-
jority opinion can be derived from the Supreme Court's position in
FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,"1 wherein it was stated:
The enforcement responsibility of the courts, once a Commission
order has become final . . . is to adjudicate questions concerning
the order's violation, not questions of fact supporting that valid
order.32
While acknowledging that the underlying order is not subject to attack
in a civil penalty suit,3 3 Judge Friendly reasoned that the district
court's responsibility under the Act is to make an independent deter-
mination of whether the order was violated. 4 Moreover, the FTC's
duties terminate once it has certified to the Attorney General those
facts which gave the Commission "reason to believe" that its order had
26 498 F.2d at 443.
27 Id. at 439-40.
28 Id. at 445.
29 Id. at 460.
30 Id. at 458. See note 42 infra.
31334 U.S. 37 (1948).
32 Id. at 54 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as Morton Salt was a proceeding to review
an FTC order to cease and desist from price discrimination deemed unlawful under
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), the Supreme Court's statement, relied upon in Williams, may be
regarded as dictum. However, it appears that the Supreme Court did distinguish the
role of the courts in adjudicating the violation of an order from that of the FTC in
formulating the order. See 334 U.S. at 54.
33 498 F.2d at 429-80 n.17. Since 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) provides for initial review
of an FTC order by a court of appeals, the order may not be collaterally examined in
a subsequent civil penalty proceeding. See United States v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119
(S.D. Cal. 1941), aj'd, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942). See also
Farmington Dowell Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1969) (private
antitrust suit under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
34 498 F.2d at 422, 430.
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been violated.3 5 Thus, Judge Friendly found no difficulty in applying
the general proposition that "there is a right of jury trial when the
United States sues . . . to collect a penalty, even though the statute
is silent on the right of jury trial."'36
Judge Friendly's conclusion that the Act vests full adjudicatory
power in the district courts appears manifestly sound as a matter of
statutory construction. The FTC is authorized to determine which
acts or practices constitute "false advertising" within the meaning of
the Act. However, the issuance of a cease and desist order was the sole
means delegated by Congress to the FTC to prevent such advertising.87
The Act contains no provision authorizing the FTC to levy penalties
upon disobedient parties. In the event the FTC "has reason to believe"
that its order has been violated,38 it must, in order to remedy the
violation by civil penalty, bring an action in the district court.39
35 Id. at 429. The language of the Act requiring certification of facts by the FTC
to the Attorney General is particularly relevant:
Whenever the Federal Trade Commission has reason to believe that any person,
partnership, or corporation is liable to a penalty... it shall . . . certify the
facts to the Attorney General, whose duty it shall be to cause appropriate
proceedings to be brought ....
15 U.S.C. § 56 (Supp. III, 1973) (emphasis added). It would seem that had Congress
intended the Commission's determination to carry conclusive weight, it not only would
have so specified in the Act, but also would have employed somewhat stronger language
than that utilized in § 56.
30498 F.2d at 422-23, quoting 5 J. MoolE, FEDERAL. PRAcmrcE 38.31[l], at 232-33
(2d ed. 1971).
The only other court passing directly on the jury trial issue reached a decision in
accord with that of the majority in Williams. In United States v. Hindman, 179 F. Supp.
926 (D.N.J. 1960), despite an FTC order that the defendant cease labeling his garments
"custom-made," the defendant continued to label his garments' "custom-tailored." In a
civil penalty action for the alleged violation of the order, the district court denied cross
motions for summary judgment, holding that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial
"on the limited issue as to whether or not the label term 'custom-tailored' . . . means
to [defendant's] purchasers that they are 'custom-made"' as prohibited by the order. Id.
at 938. Nonetheless, in footnote dictum, the Third Circuit later criticized Hindman as
erroneous. United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257, 258 n.2
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 821 (1961). See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
In reaching his decision in Williams, Judge Friendly noted that the available authority
was "scarcely dispositive" of the jury trial issue, and considered the question as one of
first impression. 498 F.2d at 422.
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). The powers of the FTC are derived from congressional
legislation, but the Act nowhere confers authority on the FTC to adjudicate violations of
its orders. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957); Community Blood
Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1969); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,
363 F.2d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 1966).
38 15 U.S.C. § 56 (Supp. III, 1973). See note 35 supra.
30 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. III, 1973) provides: -
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay
to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation,
which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil
action ....
Judge Oakes' remark that "one feature of § 45(l) is to avoid the expense and delay
1975]
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Judge Oakes' argument for "administrative expertise" 40 seems mis-
directed. It is undeniable that FTC expertise is critically important in
the formulation of cease and desist orders. Equally important, how-
ever, is the congressional designation of the district court, not the
FTC, as the forum for adjudication of alleged order violations.4 1 By
judicial fiat, the dissent would designate the FTC as the adjudicator
of such violations, subject to an extremely limited judicial review.4
With so restricted a role, the district court might well become a mere
"rubber stamp" for the FTC.
The dissent feared that by permitting a jury to pass upon the
meaning of the advertisements, the FTC "would be stripped of its
major function... in the regulatory scheme - deciding what is and
what is not deceptive advertising."43 Judge Oakes noted44 that in
United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 45 a similar concern
was voiced by the Third Circuit in dictum.46 However, under the
of further formal proceedings after a cease and desist order ha[s] become final," 498
F.2d at 454 (emphasis in original), conflicts with the plain language of § 45(), which
provides for recovery of a civil penalty "in a civil action."
40 498 F.2d at 460.
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. 1I1, 1973). See note 39 supra.
42 Judge Oakes relied on Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam), for judicial
review based on an "arbitrary or capricious" standard. 498 F.2d at 454-55. This reliance
appears misplaced. Camp held that where a statute directs certain administrative action,
but is silent on the right of judicial review, review may be had under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). 411 U.S. at 140. In Camp, the standard of review
to be applied under the Administrative Procedure Act was "whether the Comptroller's
adjudication was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law .... ' Id. at 142, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(2)(A) (1970).
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45() (Supp. 1I1, 1973), however,
directs the district court, not the FTC, to determine whether an order has been violated.
Therefore, since there was no administrative action regarding an alleged order violation
to be reviewed in Williams, the Camp rule is inapplicable. Notably, where Congress did
direct FTC action, i.e., issuance of a cease and desist order, it displayed no difficulty in
providing for judicial review. See id. § 45(c) ("substantial evidence" test for review of
FTC orders). It would seem that if Congress had intended the FTC to determine order
violations, it also would have provided a specific standard of judicial review of such
determinations. The Federal Trade Commission Act, however, is silent as to both matters.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 53, 56 (Supp. I1, 1973).
43 498 F.2d at 440-41 n.2.
44 Id. at 450-51.
45 288 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). Vulcanized Rubber af-
firmed a lower court's summary disposition of a § 45() civil penalty proceeding where
"there was no issue of fact presented ...." 288 F.2d at 258 n.2.
Even under Williams, there would exist no need for a jury trial in the absence of
a genuine dispute over the fact of violation. 498 F.2d at 421, 430. See United States v.
Beatrice Food Co., 344 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974)
(no material factual issue as to the violation of an FTC order present requiring a jury
trial in a civil penalty action); United States v. Piuma, 40 F. Supp. 119, 123 (S.D. Cal.
1941), aff'd, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637 (1942) (summary judgment
proper in a civil penalty action where "no substantial issue of fact in dispute").
46 The Third Circuit criticized United States v. Hindman, 179 F. Supp. 926 (D.N.J.
1960), stating:
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Williams majority opinion, the jury is to make no independent deter-
mination of whether the advertising is deceptive, but is merely to
resolve disputed factual issues as to whether the advertisements make
representations prohibited by the FTC order.47 It is thus difficult to
perceive how a jury would "strip" the FTC of its major function of
determining what constitutes deceptive advertising.
Having concluded that the Act entrusted the courts with adjudi-
catory power over order violations in civil penalty actions, Judge
Friendly examined the numerous precedents for applying the seventh
amendment right of jury trial to actions to recover civil penalties.48
Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Curtis v. Loether49 and Pernell
v. Southall Realty,5" held that the seventh amendment requires a jury
trial in civil actions to enforce statutory rights. The Court in Curtis
held that where the statutory scheme provided for a civil action for
the recovery of actual and punitive damages, "the traditional form
of relief offered in the courts of law," 51 the parties were entitled to
a jury trial under the "dear command of the Seventh Amendment."52
In Pernell, the Court again found the seventh amendment applicable
The holding [in Hindman] was erroneous, since the sole issue before the court
was whether or not the labeling practice was within the proscription of the
order and not whether the labeling practice was deceptive. . . . Moreover,
creating an issue of fact as the court did in Hindman, would usurp the function
exclusively vested by Congress in the Federal Trade Commission to determine
the issue of whether a labeling practice is misleading or deceptive to the public.
288 F.2d at 258-59 n.2 (citation omitted).
While the Third Circuit succinctly framed the Hindman issue, it seems to have
misinterpreted the holding therein. Hindman did not authorize the jury to make any
independent determination as to whether the defendant's labels were deceptive, but
reserved to the jury only the question of whether the defendant's labels were prohibited
by the FTC order. See note 36 supra. If the jury found that the labels were proscribed
by the order, the FTC's determination that such labels were deceptive would warrant
the imposition of civil penalties. The Third Circuit's concern with "usurping" the FTC's
function is thus difficult to justify. The Vulcanized Rubber footnote dictum is criticized
in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcriON 319 n.237 (1965).
47498 F.2d at 430-32. See L. JAFFE, JuDicrAL CONTROL OF ADmNIrsTRATIVE ACTION
393 (1965): "It has long been assumed that in an action for violating an administrative
order, only the fact of violation of the order is to be tried by the jury." See generally
5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE 38.11[7] (2d ed. 1974). See also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
48 498 F.2d at 422-24.
49 415 US. 189 (1974). In Curtis, after noting that the legislative history was "sparse"
and "ambiguous" on the question, the Supreme Court held that "the Seventh Amendment
entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal courts
under [the Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 804(a), 812, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3612 (1970)]."
415 U.S. at 192 (footnote omitted).
50 416 U.S. 363 (1974). Pernell was an eviction proceeding under D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1501 (1973). The Supreme Court found that the seventh amendment required a
trial by jury, although the statute was silent as to such right. 416 U.S. at 376.
5 1415 U.S. at 196 (footnote omitted).
52 Id. at 198 (footnote omitted).
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to a statutory civil action for eviction.53 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.54 and Block v. Hirsch,55 which denied the right to jury
trial, were respectively distinguished in Curtis" and Perne157 on the
basis that, in both cases, Congress had vested administrative agencies,
not courts, with the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties.
Judge Oakes refused to accept as precedent the cases relied upon
by the majority, arguing that none of these decisions granted the right
of jury trial in an action to recover civil penalties for the violation
of an administrative order. s However, this appears to be a fruitless
distinction. As previously indicated, Congress granted the authority to
53416 U.S. at 376.
54301 U.S. 1 (1937). Jones & Laughlin was a proceeding to review an NLRB order
to pay back wages of reinstated employees. The Board was empowered under § 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act to issue cease and desist orders and to take "af-
firmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay .... "
Under § 10(e), the Board's actions "if supported by evidence," were to be final. Act of
July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 10(c),(e), 49 Stat. 449. The Court, in rejecting the defendant-
employer's objections based on the seventh amendment, stated:
[The seventh amendment] preserves the right which existed under the common
law when the amendment was adopted ...
The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a
suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory
proceeding.... The contention under the Seventh Amendment is without merit.
301 U.S. at 48-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). But see Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974), wherein the Court noted that the seventh amendment "requires
trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law .... "
55256 U.S. 135 (1921). In Block, the Court dealt with the Rent Commission of the
District of Columbia, created by Congress to regulate rents and to determine a tenant's
right to remain in possession after his lease had expired. Act of Oct. 22, 1919, ch. 80,
tit. II, §§ 102, 109, 41 Stat. 298. The Court therein held:
If the power of the Commission established by the statute to regulate the rela-
tion is established, as we think it is, ... this objection [by the landlord that
the parties were deprived of a seventh amendment right of jury trial] amounts
to little.
256 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added). Unlike the statute construed in Block, the language
of 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. III, 1973), providing for a judicial civil action, would appear
to place the power in question, viz., adjudication of FTC order violations, beyond the
scope of the agency. See note 39 supra.
56 In Curtis, the Court stated:
Jones &' Laughlin merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh Amendment
-is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would
be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudications and
would substantially interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory scheme.
415 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The adjudicative role of the NLRB
within the statutory scheme of the National Labor Relations Act, see note 54 supra,
is in -sharp contrast to the district court's adjudicative role under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, see text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
57The Pernell Court distinguished Block on the basis that, in Block, the Rent
Commission's power to "regulate the relation" was established, and thus any seventh
amendment claims were inappropriate because they were "incompatible with the whole
concept of administrative adjudication." 416 U.S. at 383, citing Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
158 498 F.2d at 451.
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determine whether an FTC order has been violated to the district
court, not the FTC.5 9 Moreover, the legislative history of the Act indi-
cates no congressional intent to eliminate the right to trial by jury
traditionally available in actions to recover civil penalties for statutory
violations.60 Accordingly, it would appear reasonable to conclude that
this right properly obtains in an action to recover the civil penalties
imposed by the Federal Trade Commission Act 61 for violation of an
FTC order.
The dissent further maintained that the "practical abilities and
limitations of juries"62 militated strongly against granting a jury trial
in Williams.63 Relying upon several references in the legislative history
of the Act to "the American gullible public,"" Judge Oakes concluded
that Congress could not have intended a jury to pass upon the ques-
tion of what constitutes deceptive advertising. 5 However, the majority
placed no reliance on a jury's ability to discern whether an advertise-
ment is deceptive. On the contrary, the Second Circuit's decision in
Williams respects the function of the FTC by having a jury resolve
only factual issues as to whether challenged advertisements contain
representations which have been prohibited by the FTC in a cease and
desist order.6 Thus, both the FTC function to prevent deceptive
advertising under the Act and the seventh amendment right to jury
trial are preserved.
59 See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
60 See 498 F-2d at 426-27.
In Mecker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412 (1915), the Supreme Court held that
the defendant's right to a jury trial remained inviolate in an action to recover civil
damages for a statutory violation, even where Congress had gone so far as to render
an ICC reparation order prima fade evidence of a violation. The Meeker Court stated:
This provision [rendering the ICC's order prima facie evidence in a civil damage
suit] . . . cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full cofitestation of
all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. . It
does not abridge the right of trial by jury or take away any of its incidents.
Id. at 430.
61 15 U.S.C. § 45() (Supp. II, 1973).
62 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). See 498 F.2d at 452. Ross held
the seventh amendment right to jury trial applicable to a stodcholders' derivative suit.
The Supreme Court stated that the seventh amendment "embrace[s] all suits which are
not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they
may assume to settle legal rights." 396 U.S. at 533 (citation omitted). Judge Oakes'
reference in Williams is to one of three factors considered by the Ross Court in deter-
mining whether an issue is "legal" in nature, in which case a right to jury trial inheres.
The three factors were: "the pre-merger' [of law and equity] custom," "'the remedy
sought," and "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n.10.
63 498 F.2d at 452-53.
04 Id. at 447, citing 83 CONG. REc. 394, 416 (1938) (remarks of Representatives Sirovich
and Coffee).
65 498 F.2d at 447, 452-53.
66 See text accompanying note 47 supra.,
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ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW
Perhaps, as acknowledged by Judge Friendly, "it would be wiser
for Congress to allow the FTC to impose penalties for violations of
its orders, subject to limited judicial review," 67 but Congress has not
yet seen fit to do so. Where Congress has designated the district court
as the forum for adjudicating violations of FTC orders and for im-
posing the consequent civil penalties, "it must preserve to the parties
their right to jury trial."68 Thus, Judge Friendly's majority opinion
in Williams strikes a proper accord between the seventh amendment
and the Federal Trade Commission Act as currently written.
Christopher R. Belmonte
FDA DIETARY SUPPLEMENT REGULATIONS
National Nutritional Foods Association v. FDA
Section 4011 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act2 empowers the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to promulgate a "reasonable
definition and standard of identity" for any food under its "common or
usual name" when such action "will promote honesty and fair dealing
in the interest of consumers." 3 When first proposed, the section was
viewed as a tool to protect consumers against cheapened products.4
Identity standards for particular foods, such as a requirement that pea-
nut butter consist of 90 percent peanuts, have been utilized to guar-
antee the sale of products conforming to an established minimum
standard of quality.5 The Second Circuit, in National Nutritional
67 498 F.2d at 430.
68 Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (citation omitted).
As was probably realized by Judge Oakes, see 498 F.2d at 441 n.8, the majority
holding places the vindication of the Sixth Circuit's parallel enforcing order in the hands
of a jury. See text accompanying note 3 supra. Such a result is, however, a necessary
corollary to a statutory scheme which provides for the alternative remedy of a civil
penalty to be adjudicated in district court. Indeed, a jury dearly would be required to
vindicate a circuit court's parallel enforcing order in the event a criminal proceeding is
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1970), see note 5 supra, where the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury would be applicable.
121 U.S.C. § 341 (1970).
2 Id. § 301 et seq.
3 Id. § 341.
4 27 C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND Cosamrio Ac 1073 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as DUNN]. During legislative hearings, illustrations of cheapened foods included: (1) butter
to which water was added to reduce fat content, id. at 218; (2) oysters to which water
was added, id. at 161; (3) jams and preserves in which a higher percentage of sugar than
fruit was used, id. at 819.
5 See, e.g., Corn Prods. Co. v. HEW, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970) (sustaining a peanut butter standard of identity requiring a minimum of 90% pea-
nut content); Columbia Cheese Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 777 (1944) (upholding a cream cheese standard of at least 33% milk fat).
For an explanation of the purpose of § 401 as a means of setting a minimum standard
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